At VB2017 in Madrid,
  
   ESET
  
  researchers Anton Cherepanov and Robert Lipovsky presented a
  
   last-minute paper
  
  on Industroyer, a malware framework that was responsible for the December 2016 blackout in Ukraine.
  The attack was perhaps less noteworthy for what it achieved (a relatively short blackout) than for the potential it signalled. Such was the premise of
  
   Dragos
  
  researcher Joe Slowik, who presented a full paper on the framework at VB2018 in Montreal.
  The framework, which
  
   Dragos
  
  calls CRASHOVERRIDE (the name difference stems from a different opinion on its focus), includes very sophisticated ICS-specific malware but uses standard “living off the land” techniques to move within an infected network. In his paper, Joe explains in detail how the malware works and how it targets various protocols used to operate the electric grid.
  Today we have published Joe’s paper in both
  
   HTML
  
  and
  
   PDF
  
  format. We have also uploaded the video of his presentation to our
  
   YouTube
  
  channel.
   
   Anatomy of an attack: detecting and defeating CRASHOVERRIDE
  
   
    Read the paper (HTML)
   
  
   
    Download the paper (PDF)
   
   
    
   
  
  If you’re going to be at the RSA Conference in San Francisco this week, make sure you check out the
  
   two talks
  
  Joe will deliver there.
  And of course, don’t forget that the
  
   Call for Papers
  
  for VB2019 remains open until the end of next week (deadline 17 March). Analyses of attacks against ICS, or tools to analyse or fight them, are very welcome.
 
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