At VB2017 in Madrid,
ESET
researchers Anton Cherepanov and Robert Lipovsky presented a
last-minute paper
on Industroyer, a malware framework that was responsible for the December 2016 blackout in Ukraine.
The attack was perhaps less noteworthy for what it achieved (a relatively short blackout) than for the potential it signalled. Such was the premise of
Dragos
researcher Joe Slowik, who presented a full paper on the framework at VB2018 in Montreal.
The framework, which
Dragos
calls CRASHOVERRIDE (the name difference stems from a different opinion on its focus), includes very sophisticated ICS-specific malware but uses standard “living off the land” techniques to move within an infected network. In his paper, Joe explains in detail how the malware works and how it targets various protocols used to operate the electric grid.
Today we have published Joe’s paper in both
HTML
and
PDF
format. We have also uploaded the video of his presentation to our
YouTube
channel.

Anatomy of an attack: detecting and defeating CRASHOVERRIDE
Read the paper (HTML)
Download the paper (PDF)
If you’re going to be at the RSA Conference in San Francisco this week, make sure you check out the
two talks
Joe will deliver there.
And of course, don’t forget that the
Call for Papers
for VB2019 remains open until the end of next week (deadline 17 March). Analyses of attacks against ICS, or tools to analyse or fight them, are very welcome.
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